This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the e¤ects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection e¤ects, using data on U.S. governors for 1982-2012. We …nd that the possibility of reelection provides a signi…cant incentive for incumbents to exert e¤ort. We also …nd a selection e¤ect, although it is weaker in terms of its e¤ect on average governor performance. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4:2% compared to a one-term regime, and …nd that a three-term regime may improve voter welfare even further.
Introduction
A key aspect of a well-functioning democracy is the accountability of o¢ cials via elections.
Elections may improve outcomes by giving incumbents incentives to exert e¤ort, thus disciplining poor performance (Barro [1973] , Ferejohn [1986] ). They may serve a selection function by screening out low performers (Banks and Sundaram [1993] , Fearon [1999] , Smart and Sturm [2013] , Duggan and Martinelli [2015] ), but may also lead incumbents to pander to voters with policies that improve their chances of reelection even if they are not socially bene…cial. 1 One may thus ask what are the e¤ects of barring reelection at some point by introducing limits on the number of terms that a politician may serve. Though term limits may reduce electoral pandering and prevent politicians from becoming too "entrenched"in o¢ ce and thus unresponsive to voter concerns, they may also reduce the incentives for incumbents to exert e¤ort. They may imply a loss of the bene…ts of the experience gained by veteran lawmakers.
Term limits may also reduce the information that voters have about candidates, negatively impacting the screening function of elections. 2 Separating and quantifying these various e¤ects provides a signi…cant challenge to assessing both the positive and the normative e¤ects of imposing or changing term limits. Examining the e¤ect of term limits further addresses the larger issue of electoral accountability in the political agency model. The wide application of this model in political economy suggests the importance of assessing its empirical relevance.
Many papers have used a reduced-form approach to try to estimate the e¤ects of term limits. We discuss these papers in greater detail in Section 2. By its very nature, reducedform estimation faces the di¢ culty of disentangling the importance of various factors -such as discipline versus selection -on the net e¤ect of term limits. Nor can such an approach be used to consider counterfactual experiments central to assessing the welfare impact of term limits.
This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the e¤ects of term limits and thus electoral accountability. We set out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard. In the model politicians are of two types: "good", who are always willing to exert high e¤ort; and "bad", who would exert low e¤ort in the absence of incentives, such as the possibility of another term in the o¢ ce. Neither the e¤ort level chosen by politicians 1 There is a large empirical literature on the e¤ect of elections on outcomes, termed political economic cycles. Drazen (2005, 2008) summarize key …ndings for political budget cycles. Welfare implications of opportunistic policymaker behavior are studied by Maskin and Tirole (2004) , among others. 2 These e¤ects may also characterize indirectly-elected policymakers, as in Vlaicu and Whalley (2014) .
nor their type are observable to voters. Instead, they observe incumbent performance, an outcome that partially depends on the e¤ort. Voters use observed performance to decide whether or not to reelect the politician. We design our model to mimic those U.S. states where governors have a two-term limit in o¢ ce, currently the most prevalent regime. As such, in their second term politicians choose their e¤ort level, understanding that the reelection incentive is no longer relevant.
Estimation of the structural parameters of the model allows us to quantify discipline and selection e¤ects and to assess their importance without relying on strong identi…cation assumptions. We consider a baseline of no electoral accountability, that is, where there is no possibility of reelection. On the basis of this, we can measure how much electoral accountability improves outcomes, as well as whether improvements come mainly through discipline or through selection. The structural model also allows us to run experiments to assess the welfare e¤ects of changing term limits, where the invariance of structural parameters to the term-limit regime is critical in avoiding the Lucas (1976) critique. 3 Our main …ndings are as follows. We …nd that 52% of governors are good and exert high e¤ort independent of which term they are in. The possibility of reelection provides a signi…cant incentive for some bad governors to exert high e¤ort in order to increase their chances of reelection. Compared to the case with a one-term limit, allowing a second term leads 27% of bad governors choose to exert high e¤ort in their …rst term of o¢ ce, implying a 13 percentage point increase in the fraction of all governors who exert high e¤ort in their …rst term. Discipline is not stronger because of a stochastic relation between e¤ort and performance, as well as an exogenous random component to election outcomes, that is, success or failure in reelection uncorrelated with performance. The two-term-limit regime leads to an increase in voter lifetime welfare of about 4:2% relative to the case of a oneterm limit. More than half of this gain in welfare comes from the disciplining e¤ect of bad governors. The remainder comes from the selection e¤ect, that is, more good governors surviving to the second term because better …rst-term performance stochastically signals high e¤ort and hence a higher probability that the governor is of the good type. The selection e¤ect is reduced by a mimicking e¤ect in that high …rst-term e¤ort by bad governors makes it harder for voters to identify them as such. In the absence of mimicking, discipline and selection e¤ects would be roughly the same size, but mimicking reduces the latter by about
40%:
We then consider a version of the model where e¤ort is at least partially observable.
This leads to increased discipline, but this e¤ect is imperfect due to the stochastic nature of election outcomes: since bad governors know that they can still get reelected due to a favorable election shock, they do not have a large incentive to exert high e¤ort. Even if e¤ort were fully observable, only 43% of bad governors are disciplined, leading to a modest 1:6% increase in welfare relative to the case of unobservable e¤ort.
Finally, we consider an electoral reform where we increase term limits from two to three terms. This reform leads to a large increase in discipline (61% of bad governors exert high e¤ort in their …rst term and 26% of them do so in their second term), leading to an increase in the welfare of voters of 2:8% relative to the two-term benchmark.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we brie ‡y review the literature on empirical estimation of the e¤ects of electoral accountability. In section 3 we present our political agency model with a two-term limit. Section 4 describes our solution and estimation methods and data. We then present and discuss our estimates and their implications in Section 5. The …nal section presents conclusions. An appendix presents technical details.
Literature
As indicated above, there have been a number of papers using reduced-form estimation to test the e¤ects of term limits on politician performance. For example, Besley and Case for reelection to perform better makes it harder to distinguish good and bad governors on the basis of outcomes, thus weakening the selection e¤ect. Hence, the comparison of performance of reelection-eligible governors and lame-duck governors can only reveal a net e¤ect. 4 Some of the above research makes further assumptions to try to disentangle the e¤ects. 4 Ashworth (2012) makes a similar point in his excellent survey of research on electoral accountability. performance of term-limited incumbents in di¤erent terms (since each has been elected a di¤erent number of times but cannot be reelected again).
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As suggestive as these arguments are, they often rely on special assumptions to tease out e¤ects. Moreover, they do not fully allow separation of the discipline and selection e¤ects. To our knowledge, the only structural approach to the e¤ects of reelection has been that of Sieg and Yoon (2014) . 6 They ask whether the mechanism of reelection gives an incentive for incumbents to moderate their …scal policies -Democratic incumbents to act more …scally conservative, Republican incumbents to act more …scally liberal. They …nd this is the case for about 1/5 of Democratic incumbents and 1/3 of Republican incumbents. Our paper di¤ers in some important respects. A key one is a di¤erent focus, where our paper looks at the incentive e¤ects of reelection on governor e¤ort and overall performance rather than on the stance of …scal policies as in their paper. As such, the papers are complementary.
Second, neither the moral hazard problem of low e¤ort, central to our analysis, nor selection 5 Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) estimate how increasing politicians' wages a¤ects the composition of the candidate pool and the reelection incentives of those elected. Using a regression discontinuity design and Italian mayoral elections data they …nd that higher wages increase performance and does so disproportionately through attracting more competent types. 6 Structural estimation is relatively rare in political economy. Some examples are Merlo (1997), Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003) , and Strömberg (2008) . over non-partisan characteristics, such as competence, play a role in Sieg and Yoon (2014) , where competence is assumed to be fully observed. Hence, given the aim of their paper, there is no attempt to measure the contribution of selection versus discipline on improving outcomes, a focus of much of the earlier literature and of our paper.
Model
As our benchmark model, we start with a simple political agency model with voters and politicians that can generate stochastic policy outcomes and reelection rules. Subsequent versions of the model relax some of this model's assumptions. All voters are assumed to have the same information set and preferences, allowing modeling of a single representative voter. A governor may serve a maximum of two terms. After a governor's …rst term, voters may choose to replace her with a randomly drawn challenger. If a governor has served two terms, the election is between two randomly drawn challengers. The equilibrium concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, which will be de…ned formally below.
Governor Types
All governors enjoy rents of r > 0 in each term they are in o¢ ce. A governor is one of two types, either "good" ( = G) or "bad" ( = B) ; where the probability that a governor is good is P f = Gg ; where 0 1: Governors choose the level of their e¤ort. The cost of exerting low e¤ort (e = L) is normalized to be zero. The di¤erence between good and bad governors is in the cost they assign to exerting high e¤ort (e = H). In any term of o¢ ce good governors have no cost of exerting high e¤ort, while bad governors have a positive utility cost c; which is expressed as a fraction of the rents r of o¢ ce. 7 For ease of exposition, we de…ne c (e; ) r the cost of e¤ort level e for a governor of type ; where
We assume that, like the governor's type ; the cost c is observed by the governor but unobserved by the electorate. A bad governor draws c from a uniform distribution on the 7 Note that the two types and their levels of e¤ort should not be interpreted too literally. A bad governor can be one who is rent-seeking or otherwise not "congruent"with the voters; for example, leaders may di¤er in their inherent degree of "other-regarding" preferences towards voters, as discussed in Drazen and Ozbay (2015) . Alternatively, a bad governor can be one who is low competence (and thus …nds it very costly to exert su¢ cient e¤ort to produce good outcomes), or otherwise a poor …t for the executive duties of a governor. unit interval [0; 1] when …rst elected, where c remains the same in all terms while in o¢ ce. 8 The governor understands that her chance of winning reelection is H if she exerts high e¤ort and L if she exerts low e¤ort, where in equilibrium L < H . Di¤erent levels of e¤ort lead to di¤erent distributions of observed possible outcomes (as speci…ed in equations (5) below).
Hence, these probabilities are a combination of the performance of the governor given her e¤ort and the probability of reelection given her performance, and they will be determined in equilibrium.
Governors'E¤ort Choice
The problem of a governor of type is
where e i is e¤ort in term i and 1 H is an index which equals 1 if e 1 = H and 0 otherwise.
The actions of a good governor are trivial -she exerts high e¤ort in the …rst term (e 1 = H)
since it is costless and strictly increases her chances of reelection. Since e¤ort is costless and she is indi¤erent over e¤ort levels in the second term, we simply assume that e 2 = H as well. 9 For a bad governor it is clear that the optimal choice for the second term is e 2 = L since exerting high e¤ort in the second term is costly and has no bene…t. 10 To derive e 1 ; note that if a bad governor exerts high e¤ort in her …rst term, her payo¤ is (1 c + H ) r, and if she exerts low e¤ort, her payo¤ is (1 + L ) r: In words, by exerting high e¤ort the governor would forego some of the …rst-term rent but would increase her chances of reelection, thus enjoying the rent for an extra term. She would therefore …nd it optimal to exert high e¤ort if and only if
The voter does not observe c; but understands the maximization problem that governors face. 8 We also considered more general speci…cations, including a Beta (a; b) distribution, where the uniform distribution we use is a special case with a = b = 1: However, a and b were not separately identi…ed in our estimation. 9 If we assumed that good types like exerting high e¤ort, i.e. c (H; G) < 0, she would strictly prefer e 2 = H: This would also follow if, consistent with what we argue below about the relation between e¤ort and expected performance, the good type preferred higher performance. 10 In reality, good last-term performance may of course improve opportunities after the governor leaves o¢ ce. The basic point however is that for bad governors the impossibility of another term reduces a key incentive to perform well, so that they will put in less e¤ort than good governors and perform less well, a phenomenon that we observe in the data.
He therefore can calculate the probability that a bad governor exerts high e¤ort in her …rst term, that is, P fe 1 = Hj = Bg : Given the assumption of a uniform distribution for c;
we may then write
Voter' s Problem
The voter lives forever and prefers higher to lower y; where y is the performance of the governor in o¢ ce. For simplicity, we assume the voter's utility is linear in y: We assume that this performance variable is in part in ‡uenced by the e¤ort choice of the governor according to the rule
Since the variance of the two distributions is the same, if the governor exerts high e¤ort, the outcome will be drawn from a distribution that …rst-order stochastically dominates the one with low e¤ort. Note that we also assume that the relationship between e¤ort and performance is independent of the governor's type or the term she is in.
We further assume probabilistic voting in that the utility of the voter is a¤ected by a shock " N ( ; 2 " ) occurring right before the election (that is, after e 1 is chosen). This "electoral"shock may re ‡ect last-minute news about either the incumbent or the challenger, an exogenous preference for one of the candidates, or anything that a¤ects election outcomes that is unrelated to the performance of the governor. Hence, the existence of the election shock makes elections uncertain events given the performance of incumbents. Furthermore > 0 will capture an incumbency advantage, as will be clear below.
De…ne W (y 1 ; ") as the voter's life-time expected utility after observing the …rst-term performance of a governor and the election shock. It can be expressed recursively as
where is the voter's discount rate between electoral terms, and R is the decision to re-elect.
After observing the performance of the incumbent governor, the voter makes his reelection choice. If he reelects the governor, he will enjoy her second term performance, which will be followed by the election of a new governor drawn from the pool of candidates. The successor governor will deliver a …rst-term performance y 0 1 and face a reelection shock of " 0 : If the voter does not reelect the incumbent, then a fresh draw from the pool of candidates occurs.
The election shock " shows up as an additive term to the utility of the voter, where a positive " makes the incumbent more appealing relative to the challenger. Note that " does not a¤ect the type or actions of the challenger that the incumbent faces. It is also important to note that the voter realizes that he may arrive at this node with (y 1 ; ") in one of three ways: a good governor, a bad governor who exerted high e¤ort, and a bad governor who exerted low e¤ort. The voter, of course, does not know which of these is the case, but has beliefs about them.
We can rewrite the voter's problem as
where we use V to denote E [W (y
which is a constant since none of the stochastic variables are persistent. It can be written as
where ( ) represents the standard normal PDF. Equation (8) makes it explicit that there is uncertainty with respect to the type of the governor, her e¤ort and performance in the …rst term, as well as the election shock that will be drawn before the election at the end of the …rst term. In what follows, we proceed as if V is a known constant, and it will be solved as a part of the equilibrium. Note further that
where^ (y 1 ) P ( = Gjy 1 ) ; that is, the voter's posterior probability that the incumbent is good after observing …rst-term performance. Using (9) we can write W (y 1 ; ") as
Election
If types were observable, the voter would reelect only good governors since they would exert high e¤ort in their second term while bad governors would not. Since neither type nor e¤ort is observable, and due to the existence of the election shock, the reelection decision is not linked deterministically to y 1 . Solving the discrete choice problem in (10), the incumbent would win reelection, i.e. R = 1; if and only if
which shows that the incumbent will win reelection if the …rst-term outcome y 1 is su¢ ciently good (so that the voter has a high posterior probability of the incumbent being good) or if the election shock " is not too small or too negative (so that the incumbent does not have too small an incumbency advantage). We can summarize the decision rule R (y 1 ; ") with the
where " =" (y 1 ) characterizes the points (y 1 ; ") for which (11) holds with equality witĥ
The voter uses the following Bayesian updating rule to infer the type of an incumbent
where , as de…ned in (4), is the voter's (correct) assessment about the probability that a bad governor will exert high e¤ort in her …rst term, and p (:) represents a generic density.
Denoting the reelection probability conditional on …rst-term performance by (y 1 ), we have
Finally, the last piece we need is the probabilities L and H that the governor was taking as given. These can be obtained by integrating (y 1 ) with respect to the performance distributions as in
Equilibrium
Good governors always exert e¤ort. A strategy for a bad governor is a choice of whether or not to exert e¤ort, i.e. e i (B; c) 2 fH; Lg, in each period that she is in o¢ ce, i = 1; 2;
conditional on her (privately observed) cost of e¤ort realization c. A strategy for the voter is a choice of whether or not to reelect the incumbent, i.e. R (y 1 ; ") 2 f0; 1g, given the observed incumbent's …rst-term performance y 1 , and an electoral shock realization ": The voter updates his beliefs about the incumbent's type according to^ (y 1 ) :
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a sequence of governor and voter strategies, and voter beliefs, such that in every period: the governor maximizes her future expected payo¤, given the voter's strategy, the voter maximizes his future expected payo¤ given the governor's strategy, and the voter's beliefs are consistent with governor's strategy on the equilibrium path.
As the environment is stationary, equilibrium outcomes will be a collection of equilibrium objects ( H ; L ; ; V), where is the probability that a bad governor exerts …rst-term e¤ort (equivalently, the fraction of disciplined reelection-eligible bad governors), V is the voter's life-time discounted utility, and H ; L are reelection probabilities following, respectively, high and low …rst-term governor e¤ort. Formally, we have the following de…nition.
De…nition The outcome of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game between a governor and the voter is a collection of scalars ( L ; H ; ; V) where 1. Given ; the voter's choices lead to L ; H and V: 2. Given L ; H and V, a bad governor's choice of e 1 leads to :
To summarize, Figure 1 shows a game tree of the interaction between a governor and the voter. The sequence of actions and the information structure are as follows:
1. In her …rst term, a good governor ( = G) chooses e 1 = H: A bad governor ( = B)
privately observes her cost c and she chooses e¤ort e 1 : As a result of this choice, …rst-term performance y 1 is realized.
2. The voter observes the incumbent's performance y 1 (which determines his current period utility) but not her e¤ort e 1 or type . He updates the probability that the incumbent is type G using^ (y 1 ) :
3. An election shock " is realized.
4. An election is held between the incumbent and a randomly-drawn challenger. Based on his beliefs about the type of the incumbent^ (y 1 ), the election shock ", and her performance y 1 ; the voter decides whether to retain the incumbent or replace her with the challenger. If the incumbent is not reelected, then the game restarts.
5. If the incumbent is reelected, a bad incumbent chooses e 2 = L and a good incumbent chooses e 2 = H: Based on e 2 ; a performance y 2 is drawn by nature giving the utility of the voter in that term.
6. At the end of the term, a new election is held between two randomly-drawn candidates and the game restarts.
Model with E¤ort Signal
In this version of the model we allow the voter to observe a noisy signal about the e¤ort level of the governor. We denote this signal by z and assume that it is symmetric and correct with probability ; that is then the signal has no content, and the model is identical to the benchmark model. If = 1 then the signal fully reveals the incumbent's e¤ort level, and performance is no longer an informative signal.
The signal will only be relevant in the …rst term because once an incumbent is reelected, the voter has no more actions that may be informed by the signal. Thus, the only point where the signal is useful is when the voter updates his prior that the incumbent is good.
Using z 1 to denote the signal regarding e 1 ; the posterior would be de…ned bŷ
which would then be used in calculating the voter's expected utility from reelecting the incumbent and hence his reelection rule. Note that" (y 1 ; z 1 ) and (y 1 ; z 1 ) also have z 1 as an argument since they depend on^ (y 1 ; z 1 ) :
The incumbent understands that there will be a noisy signal about her …rst-term e¤ort, which will a¤ect her chances of reelection and uses
Further details are presented in the Appendix.
Model with a Three-Term Limit
In this version we allow for a governor to remain in o¢ ce for a maximum of three terms.
The model is a straightforward extension of the two-term benchmark, but outcomes in the …rst term now have an e¤ect on both the voter's and the governor's decisions in the second term. The voter now uses not only y 2 but also y 1 to decide whether to reelect a second-term incumbent to a third term. This, in turn, makes a bad governor's e¤ort choice in the second term contingent not only on the cost of exerting e¤ort which she drew when she came to o¢ ce, but also on y 1 . That is, suppose a bad governor exerted high e¤ort in her …rst term but drew a performance outcome y 1 that was low, nonetheless being reelected to a second term due to an election shock. She may decide not to exert (costly) high e¤ort in her second term since the low y 1 makes it more di¢ cult to convince the voter to reelect her to a third term. We present the full model in the Appendix.
Solution, Estimation, and Data
In this section we discuss our strategy for solving and estimating the benchmark model. We also present our data. The details for the two extensions -the version with an e¤ort signal and the version with a three-term limit -are presented in the Appendix.
Solution
The model has seven structural parameters: ; ; Y H ; Y L ; y ; ; and " : As the de…nition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium shows, given the structural parameters, …nding the equilibrium amounts to …nding values for H ; L ; and V. In the process of doing so, we need to evaluate …ve equilibrium mappings,^ (y 1 ) ;" (y 1 ) ; R (y 1 ; ") ; W (y 1 ; ") and (y 1 ) : We solve the equilibrium as follows.
The …rst thing to notice is that once V and are known, H and L follow from (16) and (17), derived from (11), (13), and (15) . Thus solving the equilibrium amounts to satisfying (8) and (4). De…ne two residuals R 1 and R 2 as the di¤erences between conjectures for V and and the model-implied values from (8) and (4), respectively
where equilibrium requires R 1 = R 2 = 0: This can be solved easily using a nonlinear equation solver. Note that for given values for and V (and thus H and L ),^ (y 1 ) follows from (14), "(y 1 ) follows from (13), R (y 1 ; ") follows from (12), W (y 1 ; ") follows from (10) and (y 1 )
follows from (15).
Estimation
We estimate the structural parameters using Maximum Likelihood. Our data set will consist of a measure of performance (for one or two terms) and reelection outcomes for a set of governors. As such, the unit of observation will be a governor stint of one or two terms.
Given the structure of the model, we can de…ne the likelihood function analytically. For a governor who wins reelection, we observe the triplet (y 1 ; R = 1; y 2 ) : For a governor who loses reelection, we observe the pair (y 1 ; R = 0). Each of these outcomes might come from di¤erent combinations of governor types, e¤ort choices and reelection shocks. The density of a generic governor winning reelection while producing performance of y 1 and y 2 can be obtained as
The three terms capture the cases where the governor is good, bad but disciplined, and bad and not disciplined, respectively. Similarly, the density of a governor of unspeci…ed type losing reelection with …rst-term performance of y 1 is given by
For a governor k with (y 1k ; R k ; y 2k ) ; we compute her contribution to log-likelihood using
and the log-likelihood is simply given by
Estimating the structural parameters requires maximizing log L, which we do using standard numerical optimization routines. We estimate six structural parameters ( ; Y L ; Y H ; y ; ; " ) and …x = 0:85; which represents roughly a 4% annual discounting over a four-year term.
Once estimates for the structural parameters are obtained, estimates for equilibrium outcomes ( H ; L ; ; V) can be directly obtained using the invariance property of Maximum Likelihood estimation. Standard errors are computed using the White correction for heteroskedasticity for the structural parameters, and the delta method for the equilibrium outcomes. Further details of the computational method are given in the Appendix.
Data Description
In order to estimate our model, we use data for U.S. governors. The key choice we need to make is the variable that proxies for performance y in the data. In the model y represents something that enters voters'utility directly (and thus is observable to them) and at least in part a¤ected by the e¤ort of the governor. We choose job approval ratings (JAR) for this purpose because relative to alternatives such as economic, environmental or …scal outcomes, it seems to best …t our criteria. 11 Our implicit assumption in treating the JARs as measuring voter welfare is that voter approval ratings represent an accurate assessment by voters of their own welfare and not pandering by the governor. The robustness of our results to dropping the results of JAR surveys in the election year discussed in Section 5.3, where it may be argued that pandering would be most likely, supports this assumption.
A large fraction of the JAR data come from Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman (2002), and we update their dataset through the 2012 election using various online resources. The underlying data come from surveys of voters at various points of each governor's term, where they are asked to rate the governor as excellent, good, fair and poor (or "undecided"). For each governor we measure performance as the fraction of respondents who classify the governor as excellent or good out of those who express an opinion, eliminating the undecided respondents.
In order to eliminate e¤ects of the governor's reelection campaign, we use JAR up to and including June of the …nal year of the incumbent's …rst term, i.e., the election year. We do not restrict the second-term JAR. We take the simple average of the JAR numbers over a term of the governor and use them as y 1 and y 2 : From here on we use JAR to refer to the adjusted measures described in this paragraph.
Our model places some important constraints on the types of governor stints we can use in the estimation. We start with the universe of all governors that served from 1950 to present, where we have collected basic information about the governor, some of which comes from Besley (2006) . We also know the outcomes of their reelection bids. 12 We then apply 11 We also tried real income per capita growth, unemployment and change in unemployment. The former variable produced some signi…cant e¤ect on election outcomes but it was tiny in size which meant that much was "explained"by the election shock. As such, our model was not very informative. Nor did these economic variables have a high correlation with JAR. See Stein (1990) for an argument on why governors may be held less accountable than national leaders for economic conditions. 12 We consider any governor that is eligible for reelection as having run for reelection, that is, we consider the choice of not running as losing. This is justi…ed by our review of such cases where a reasonable interpretation of the events suggests that the governor decided that he or she would not be able to win reelection and either resigned or sought other alternatives. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of these governors perform quite badly in their …rst term, which results in being predicted by the model as "bad" governors who did not exert e¤ort (see Table A2 ). Dropping these governors would lead to a high value for and discipline / selection e¤ects become very small. This analyis is available upon request.
the following …lters to eliminate governors who do not …t our model of a limit of two terms of equal length across governors.
Drop governors who did not have any term limits, or had a one-term limit or a threeterm limit.
Drop governors during whose stints state election laws regarding term limits changed.
Drop governors with 2-year terms.
Drop governor stints (not just the terms) where the governor was appointed, completed someone else's term, or was elected through a special election outside the state's regular electoral cycle.
Drop governors who did not complete at least three years of their …rst term or at least two years of their second term (for example due to resignation, passing away, or being recalled).
These …lters yield 149 governor stints. 13 Combining this with the JAR data we compiled We provide the basic data that we use for estimation, namely (y 1 ; R; y 2 ) in Table A1 in the Appendix. We also revisit some of the choices we make in this section and consider alternatives in Section 5.3.
Estimation Results

Benchmark Model
Basic results
The estimates of the six structural parameters and the four equilibrium outcomes are given in Table 1 . Several things can be noted. 52% of governors in our sample are good and we strongly reject the two extremes, all governors being good or bad. Of the bad governors, 27%
of them exert high e¤ort in their …rst term and thus are disciplined. Exerting high e¤ort (for any governor) leads to an average increase in performance of over 20 JAR points, which is highly signi…cant, both statistically and economically. Figure 2 High e¤ort increases the probability of reelection from 45% to 72%. There is also a signi…cant incumbency advantage: an incumbent enters the reelection with an advantage that is equivalent to having 9:34 JAR points more than his actual JAR. The election shock has a large standard deviation, which shows that there are many elections in which a governor with a low JAR is nonetheless reelected or a governor with a high JAR is not reelected. The election shock threshold" (y 1 ) ; the posterior probability that a type is good^ (y 1 ) ; and the reelection probability (y 1 ), all conditional on observed y 1 ; are illustrated in Figure 3 .
The shapes of all these mappings originate from the shape of the^ (y 1 ) mapping, which in turn uses the normality of the process that determines y 1 : Small …rst-term JAR, for example 25, signal to the voter that the governor did not exert high e¤ort; as a result he assigns a near-zero probability of the governor being the good type. Then, for this governor to win reelection she needs an election shock of around 15 or larger. Since this is quite reasonable given the estimated values of = 9:34 and " = 13:07; there is about a 30% probability for this governor to win reelection, despite bad …rst-term performance. As y 1 increases so doeŝ (y 1 ) ; until y 1 hits 70 after which the reelection probability remains constant at around 80%;
re ‡ecting the possibility of an unfavorable election shock after a very strong performance in the …rst term.
Identi…cation
Before we turn to the implications of our model with the particular parameter estimates, it will be useful to discuss their identi…cation. First, we …nd very strong evidence that there are two types of governors (that is, 0 < < 1). To understand why this is the case, assume to the contrary that there was only one type of governor. 14 In this case y 1 and y 2 for a governor would be uncorrelated because they would be iid draws from the same distribution.
In our data, however, this correlation is 0:36: With two types of governors, and assuming for the moment that = 0 (that is, bad governors never exert high e¤ort), we can generate a positive correlation from the variation due to di¤erences in governor types.
Second, we …nd > 0: If on the contrary = 0; this would imply that (y 2 y 1 ) would be zero-mean and symmetric because every governor draws her performance outcomes from the same distribution across her terms (with mean Y H for good governors and with mean Y L for bad governors), and any di¤erences in the performance between terms is completely due to luck. In our data y 2 y 1 has a negative skewness, indicating that it has a distribution with a thicker left tail. Our model with > 0 is able to match this because the disciplined bad governors will have y 2 y 1 that is negative since they would be drawing from two di¤erent distributions in their two terms.
Third, we …nd " > 0 and > 0; indicating the presence of sizable election shocks that, on average, favor incumbents. If " were equal to 0; then any governor with^ (y 1 ) > would have to win reelection and all others would have to lose. In our sample however there are many governors who lose reelections despite good …rst-term performance, implying the presence of election shocks. Furthermore, de…ning W P (R = 1j^ (y 1 ) < ) and L P (R = 0j^ (y 1 ) > ) as the two surprises (winning elections despite bad performance and losing elections despite good performance), the election shock having a zero mean would imply W = L : However, in our sample W > L , which requires that > 0; that is, an incumbency advantage.
Finally, once these key parameters or equilibrium objects are pinned down, the other three structual parameters, that is, Y H , Y L and y ; follow from matching some of the other properties of the JAR data. These include the mean and variance of y 1 and y 2 :
Measures of interest
To understand what the parameter estimates imply for our model with a two-term limit, we report results including outcomes in a (counterfactual) one-term world in Table 2 In the second panel we look at summary measures for two-term limited governors. The two-term world is unambiguously better for the voter. First, more governors exert e¤ort in the …rst term, leading to a higher average JAR. This is because 27% of the bad governors exert e¤ort in addition to all the good governors, leading to high e¤ort 64:7% of the time in the …rst term, compared with 51:7% in the one-term case. This increases average JAR in the …rst term from 54 to 56:7. Second, because a higher fraction of bad governors than good governors are screened out in elections, more governors are good in the second term at 59:6% relative to the unconditional probability of 51:7%: Since these governors always exert e¤ort, the average JAR in the second term is 55:6, compared to 54 in the one-term case.
Putting these together, the life-time welfare of the voter goes up from 360.2 to 375.3; which is a 4:2% increase. Put di¤erently, a voter in a two-term regime would be willing to give up about 2:3 JAR points every term ad in…nitum in order to remain in that regime and not switch to a one-term regime. 15 Looking at Table 2 , it is clear that the voter is better o¤ because the governors' performance in both terms is higher relative to the one-term case.
We turn to understanding the di¤erent e¤ects of electoral accountability in next section.
Given our estimated model, we can compute a few interesting magnitudes about the governors and their performance in our sample, which are reported in Table A2 . In particular we show the performance measures y 1 and y 2 that go into the estimation, as well as^ (y 1 ) ; the updated probability that the governor is a good type after observing y 1 ; (y 1 ) ; the probability that the governor will win reelection given her …rst-term performance, as well as a new object (y 1 ; R; y 2 ) P ( = Gjy 1 ; R; y 2 ) = 8 > > > > < > > > > :
which shows the ex-post assessment of a governor's type, after having observed her performance in both terms and the reelection outcome.
We present three examples to illustrate how our model works. The …rst is Guy Hunt, who was the governor of Alabama between 1987 and 1993. His …rst-term performance is 60:1;
which is slightly lower than Y H but su¢ ciently far away from Y L for voters to believe that he is a good type with 70% probability just prior to his reelection bid. This implies a 74%
chance that he will win the election. He wins a second term and has performance of only 38:2 in the second term. As result (y 1 ; R; y 2 ) is only 8%: According to our model, he was therefore probably a bad governor who exerted high e¤ort in the …rst term and low e¤ort in his second term. Incidentally, he was forced to resign towards the end of his second term because he was convicted of theft, conspiracy and ethics violations. Our second example is Mitch Daniels, who was the governor of Indiana between 2005 and 2013. His …rst-term performance is only 48:7; leading the voters to think that he is a good type with only 31%
probability. Despite this, he wins reelection. 16 In his second term his performance is 65:2:
As a result, ex post it seems like he was a good governor who exerted e¤ort in his …rst term but had an unlucky performance draw. Our third example is David Beasley, who was the Republican governor of South Carolina from 1995 to 1999. His …rst term performance is 60:8; which gives him a 75% probability of winning his reelection bid. However, he loses reelection to the Democrat challenger Jim Hodges. This is likely to be a case where a good governor was unlucky to draw a negative election shock and lose the reelection. Indeed his loss is considered to be a surprise given how heavily Republican the state had been at the time. 17 Finally, we can also talk about how good a …t our model provides to the data. In Table A2 16 The Washington Post names his reelection campaign "The Best Gubernatorial Campaign of 2008" where he won with more votes than any candidate in the state's history. We can consider this as evidence of a large positive election shock. 17 Owners of video poker machines spent very heavily on advertisements attacking Beasley who had worked to ban it in the state during his …rst term. It is also argued that many conservative Republicans did not turn out to vote on election day because of what they perceived as Beasley's supposed " ‡ip- ‡ops"on moving the Confederate ‡ag from on top of the Capitol.
we report (y 1k ) ; the model's implied probability that an incumbent k will win reelection.
If we select a rule that predicts reelection whenever (y 1k ) > 0:5; then we can correctly predict the reelection outcomes for 75% of the governors (49 wins and 21 losses) in our sample, incorrectly predicting only 15 wins and 8 losses. One way to assess the performance of a probability forecast such as (y 1 ) is to use the Brier (1950) score, which is de…ned (though the di¤erence is no longer statistically signi…cant). Therefore, we believe that the performance of our model being at least as good as an alternative reduced-form model with the same information and signi…cantly better than a naive forecast is quite impressive.
Measuring the E¤ects of Elections
One of the key advantages of our structural approach is the ability to conduct counterfactual exercises to see how outcomes would di¤er if we changed various aspects of the environment such that the governors and voters behaved di¤erently than they do in the data. We use this advantage for two important purposes. First, in this section we measure the magnitudes of the e¤ects of having the possibility of reelection. Second, in Section 5.5, we consider a change in term limits.
Elections have three consequences in our model: discipline (bad governors exert high e¤ort to secure reelection), selection (more good governors are reelected since bad governors who exerted low e¤ort are identi…ed), and mimicking (bad governors who are disciplined look like good governors). In order to measure the …rst two e¤ects, we compare the outcomes in the benchmark model with a counterfactual model where governors can only serve one term.
Having more disciplined governors increases …rst-term outcomes relative to the one-term case since more governors overall will exert high e¤ort. In turn, when there is a second election, the selection e¤ect can be measured as the increase in outcomes in the second term of the benchmark model relative to the one-term counterfactual model, as there will be more good governors than bad governors who survive reelection and exert high e¤ort in their second term.
These e¤ects are not independent of each other. To see this, consider the case where all bad governors are disciplined, which means that all governors, good or bad, exert high e¤ort in their …rst term. As a result, there will be no information voters can use to screen governors, thus leading to identical fractions of each type of governor across the …rst and second terms, so that the percentages in each term would be identical to the one-term counterfactual. This means the outcome in the second term will be identical to the one-term outcome, that is, there is no selection e¤ect. It is important to realize that the lack of selection is a negative consequence of having more disciplined governors in the …rst term. We call this third e¤ect "mimicking". Thus, we distinguish between "pure selection", which is the screening e¤ect of elections were there no mimicking, and selection as de…ned above. Naturally, selection is equal to pure selection minus the e¤ect of mimicking.
In order to identify mimicking, we consider a second counterfactual, one where there is no discipline as an equilibrium outcome. To obtain this, we assume that the cost of exerting high e¤ort for bad governors is c = 1; which means none of them exerts high e¤ort. This ensures that = 0 in equilibrium and (4) no longer is a part of the description of equilibrium.
Naturally the voters take this into account and adjust their behavior accordingly in solving their problem. In other words, the voter solves his problem taking in to account that = 0 and this in ‡uences all equilibrium mappings including, for example, the reelection rule and thus the equilibrium outcomes L ; H and V. We solve this equilibrium using the structural parameters in Table 1 . Some details of outcomes in this counterfactual case are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows two di¤erent approaches to computing these three e¤ects. The …rst approach uses the change in the number of good governors, measured in percentage points, while the second approach uses the change in performance. Comparing the benchmark version with the one-term case, we …nd that there is a 13 percentage point increase in the fraction of governors exerting high e¤ort in their …rst term, which leads to an increase of 2:7 JAR points in performance, or a 5% increase. These are our measures of discipline. The e¤ect of selection is lower in magnitude, namely a 7.9 percentage point increase in the fraction of good governors (or equivalently governors that exert high e¤ort) in the second term, leading to a 1:6 JAR point or 3:0% increase in performance. However, the improvement in the second term due to selection is partially cancelled due to mimicking -the pure selection e¤ect is 2:6 JAR points, almost identical to discipline -but second-term performance is 1 JAR point lower due to mimicking.
As we discussed in the previous section, voters are better o¤ in the two-term-limit world relative to a one-term-limit one by about 4:2% in welfare. The decomposition in this section suggests that about 60% of this is due to the disciplining e¤ect of elections: going from the one-term-limit counterfactual to the no-discipline counterfactual, welfare goes up by 5.8
points while from the no-discipline counterfactual to the benchmark model welfare goes up by 9:3 points.
To highlight the signi…cance of our structural approach in measuring the e¤ect of elections, we close with a comparison to a reduced-form approach. A typical analysis of the e¤ect of elections, for example Besley and Case (1995) , compares the performance of politicians who are in their last terms in o¢ ce (lame ducks) with those eligible for reelection, controlling for various observable characteristics of politicians. According to our model, the …rst and second (last) term outcomes are given by the stylized equations
y 2 = baseline + pure selection mimicking (30) where "baseline" captures the level of performance that would be observed in the absence of electoral accountability, that is, independent of the e¤ect of elections. 19 If we compute the performance of lame ducks, relative to all others in our model, or, equivalently, regress the performance of all governors on a lame-duck dummy, we get y 2 y 1 = pure selection mimicking discipline. Using the numbers in Table 2 for the second approach that uses JAR, with selection as the measure of pure selection mimicking, we get 1:1: It is not clear how to interpret this number in isolation since by itself it gives us information about neither the absolute nor the relative sizes of the three channels we are able to separately identify. For example, the common …nding that performance falls in a governor's last term is often interpreted as re ‡ecting simply the lack of discipline, suggesting that removing term limits would increase voter welfare. To understand why this conclusion does not follow, consider our two-term-limit results relative to the counterfactual of having a one-term limit.
First-term performance is indeed higher due to discipline, while second-term performance is higher due to selection (which itself is mitigated by mimicking). The fall in average performance in the last term is simply due to the relative strengths of the various e¤ects, which reduced-form estimation cannot separate.
Robustness
As we explained in Section 4.3, we made some choices in preparing the JAR data for estimation. Our benchmark measure of governor performance averaged the results of all JAR surveys over a governor's …rst term up to and including June of the election year, where we used the fraction of respondents who classify the governor as excellent or good out of those who express an opinion (that is, eliminating the undecided respondents). In Table 3 we consider the robustness of our results to making di¤erent choices: using all surveys in the …rst term up to the election (All Surveys); dropping all surveys taken in the election year (No Election Year); taking the average JAR in each year of the term and then taking the year-by-year average so that respondent sentiment in a year with many surveys would not be overweighted (Year-by-Year Average); using the median (Median JAR) or the minimum JAR (Minimum JAR) rather than the average; and, taking the fraction of respondents who classi…ed the governor as excellent or good out of all respondents including the undecided (Keep Undecideds), which essentially classi…es the undecided as expressing low approval.
As the estimates make clear, the results are robust to all of these alternative performance calculations. The key is that the identi…cation of and is not a¤ected by these variations.
We also considered allowing the distributions of Y H and Y L to have di¤erent variances (Free H y ). This change also produces little substantive changes in the results. It is also useful to note that the log-likelihood of the restricted model (our benchmark) is only 0.23 log-points smaller than the likelihood of this unrestricted model and thus the restriction we place is not rejected by the data.
Noisy E¤ort Signal
The implications of a noisy e¤ort signal discussed in section 3.6 help to understand the importance of the election shock for the strength of discipline e¤ects, as well as the trade-o¤ between discipline and selection. Table 4 reports discipline and selection measures (analogous   to Table 2) for di¤erent values of the partially and fully informative signals of governor e¤ort, the latter both in the presence and absence of an election shock. (See the Appendix for the details of how this version is solved.) Throughout this section, we assume the structural parameters shown in Table 1 are unchanged but solve for the equilibrium objects for every considered. We show the re-computed in the table.
The …rst column shows the benchmark results presented above, which correspond to = 0:5 in this version. The second column shows the e¤ect of a partially informative signal of e¤ort, = 0:75: Relative to case of an uninformative (or no) signal, the fraction of bad governors disciplined rises from 27% to 30%. This is consistent with what theory would lead us to expect: a higher probability of observing "shirking" leads to more bad types exerting high e¤ort. We also …nd a stronger selection e¤ect, although the change is small; 3:2% instead of 3:0%. Hence, the higher selection e¤ect due to observability is present as theory would suggest, but is small. The reason for this will become clear shortly.
To better understand the magnitude of these e¤ects, we also considered the case of = 1; that is, perfect observability of e¤ort, as shown in the third column of Table 4 . (This, of course, is not equivalent to perfect observability of type, since bad governors can, and do, mimic the e¤ort levels of good governors.) We see that the fraction of bad governors disciplined in their …rst term rises to 43%, an increase by more than half of the 27% when e¤ort was unobservable, but not by more as one would be perhaps inclined to expect. The reason why full observability of e¤ort does not lead to all bad types exerting high e¤ort in their …rst term is the existence of the election shock. Even if a governor is known to be of bad type -perfectly indicated in this case by low e¤ort -she can still win reelection with a su¢ ciently positive realization of " (reelection probability L = 0:45); conversely, even if a bad type exerts high e¤ort, she is not guaranteed reelection (reelection probability H = 0:72) if the realization of " is su¢ ciently negative. So, bad types with a su¢ ciently high draw of c will still …nd it optimal to exert low e¤ort, even though it will be fully apparent to the voter that they did so. Hence, discipline is mitigated by the randomness of reelection outcomes due to reasons unrelated to performance, as theory once again would suggest.
To con…rm this, we simulated the model with full observability of e¤ort ( = 1) but with the election shock turned o¤ ( " = 0), so that the election shock is constrained to take its mean value = 9:34: There is no possibility of a very positive realization of " to "save" a low-e¤ort incumbent, though the average incumbency advantage is still present. Now all bad governors exert high e¤ort, and all are reelected. Mimicking of good governors by all bad governors implies there is no selection e¤ect, and the fraction of good governors in the second term is identical to the fraction in the …rst term.
We can now see why partial observability of e¤ort implied such a small increase in the selection e¤ect relative to the case of no observability. As we discussed in Section 5.2, the mimicking by bad governors in the …rst term reduces the e¤ect of selection by making it more di¢ cult to distinguish types based on the performance signal. Perfect observability of e¤ort (and hence low e¤ort making it unambiguous that a governor is bad) does not induce perfect discipline on governors when reelection has a signi…cant exogenous random component. In the limit, when e¤ort is perfectly observable and low e¤ort guarantees electoral defeat, discipline is perfect (that is, there will be no governors in the third group), but the selection e¤ect goes to zero precisely because of full mimicking by bad governors.
The last row in Table 4 shows how the welfare of the voter changes in each case. Having a moderately informative e¤ort signal is worth 0:3% of welfare to the voter while making e¤ort fully observable leads to an improvement of 1:6%; which is sizable. Much of the increase in these cases come from the higher discipline. When selection is absent due to shutting down election shocks, the welfare gain falls to 1:1%.
Electoral Reform: A Limit of Three Terms
In this section we consider an electoral reform where governors are allowed to stay in o¢ ce for three terms. To do so we use the estimated parameters from Table 1 . We realize that of the structural parameters, ; and " may depend on the term-limit regime in place.
For example, changing term limits may change incentives for people to enter politics and thus may change the composition of the pool of candidates. Since we do not model the choice of running for o¢ ce, we cannot capture this e¤ect in our model. 20 For example may be lower under a three-term electoral regime since expected lifetime rents are now higher, reducing welfare and causing us to overstate the gain from the change in term limits. Also, the parameters that govern the election shock process could possibly depend on which term the incumbent is in; for example having more information about a governor may increase incumbency advantage so that a governor who has served two terms may be reelected more easily than a governor who has served only one. 21 Similarly, perhaps election shocks may not be as large in a second reelection bid. A change in the incumbency advantage would in turn change reelection probabilities and thus the discipline e¤ect. As such, if did indeed go up, keeping the election shock process unchanged across terms would likely understate the welfare gains of the electoral reform we consider.
Finally, we assume that the mapping from e¤ort to outcomes is invariant to the term of the governor. One can argue that this can indeed be a¤ected by the term of the governor in more than one way. For example a third-term governor may have more fatigue and thus even with e¤ort outcomes may be worse. Alternatively, since a third-term governor knows the working of the system much better, perhaps things get done more easily, thus increasing performance conditional on e¤ort. These factors would have complicated e¤ects on welfare;
the possibility of fatigue would reduce the gains from the reform while the idea that a thirdterm governor will be more e¢ cient would increase the gains from reform. Thus the results in this section should be read with these caveats in mind. Table 5 summarizes our results, where key statistics, obtained via simulating the model with a three-term limit, are contrasted with those from the benchmark model with a twoterm limit. With a higher "prize" (staying in o¢ ce for an extra term), bad governors now exert e¤ort with 61:3% probability in the …rst term and 25:9% probability in the second term, compared with 26:8% probability in the …rst term for the two-term regime. 22 Overall, the voters bene…t from the reform, with welfare rising by 2:8%:
While tedious, in principle one can continue this exercise and increase the term limit to four, …ve or more terms. We think, however, that the problems we explain at the beginning of this section would become more and more signi…cant as we increase the number of terms a governor can serve and would make our assumption of treating parameters as structural less defendable. As such we do not undertake this exercise. Nevertheless, we think it is useful to know that an electoral reform in the U.S. allowing governors to serve more than two terms 22 One may question if having 61:3% of bad governors exerting high e¤ort is too high. While it is di¢ cult to answer this question exactly, we can get an idea by looking at the data for unconstrained governors. There are 137 governors in no-term-limit states who are eligible for reelection after their …rst term and 88% of them choose to run for a second term. Of those who win the second term, 54% of them run for a third term. The percentage seeking reelection to a fourth term, is 45%, still quite high. Hence, it would appear that the option of staying in o¢ ce for an extra term is indeed valuable because ex post (i.e. at end of the second term) many governors take advantage of it. 23 We can compute our measures of discipline only for the …rst term and selection only for the third term in the three-term regime since discipline and selection are combined in the second term. may lead to a signi…cant increase in voter welfare, if our assumption of holding parameters constant across regimes is not very egregious.
Conclusions
In this paper we constructed a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard, and we structurally estimated the model. The aim was to disentangle the various e¤ects that electoral accountability has on policymaker performance -speci…cally discipline and selection e¤ects -and, more generally, to assess the empirical relevance of the widelyused political agency model.
Many papers have used a reduced-form approach to try to estimate the e¤ects of electoral accountability on discipline and selection, but this approach faces the di¢ culty of disentangling the importance of these two e¤ects on policymaker performance. Structural estimation allows us to separate empirically the discipline and selection e¤ects of elections. We estimated the e¤ects on the performance of U.S. governors of the common two-term limit regime relative to the counterfactual case where reelection is not allowed, so that elections can neither discipline nor allow selection based on performance. A crucial advantage of a structural model is the possibility of estimating speci…c parameters representing discipline e¤ects and the relative prevalence of governor types, a possibility that reduced-form estimation does not allow. This is what allows counterfactual experiments to assess the welfare e¤ects of electoral accountability under di¤erent informational and electoral regimes.
We found a signi…cant discipline e¤ect of reelection incentives, as well as a somewhat weaker selection e¤ect. Quantifying these e¤ects allows us to assess their relative importance.
More generally, our results indicate that a formal political agency model stressing the role of accountability …nds support in the data, an important point given the widespread use of the political agency approach in theoretical political economy models.
Further research may help address some basic questions raised by these results. Why is there such a large fraction of "bad"governors in the data? Why don't reelection incentives discipline a larger fraction of them? Arguing that there is a large stochastic element to elections doesn't really answer the second question. These two questions are of course related.
Understanding why some governors don't perform well should help explain why the threat of not being reelected may not induce them to perform better.
In our opinion, structural estimation can be quite helpful in gaining a deeper econometric understanding of issues of politician performance and electoral accountability. We believe this paper is a useful step in that direction. Note: White standard errors are below estimates. Standard errors for the equilibrium objects are computed using the delta method. β is fixed at 0.85. Note: The numbers on this table are obtained by simulating the model for 1,000,000 terms, given the structural parameters in Table 1 . The one-term limit assumes governors are not eligible to run for reelection. The δ = 0 version is solved assuming c = 1. All changes in fractions (such as the ones for Discipline A, Selection A and Mimicking A measures) reported as percentage point changes. Table 2 for the definitions of the discipline and selection measures. Reported welfare gains are relative to the one-term regime. Notes: The first column (ζ = 0.5) shows the benchmark results from Tables 1 and 2 . Structural parameters are kept as in Table 1 . See Table 2 for the definitions of the discipline and selection measures. Notes: Structural parameters are kept as in Table 1 . See Table 2 for the definitions of the discipline and selection measures. Notes: The red horizontal lines in the first and second panels are µ (the mean of the election shock process) and π (the unconditional probability of a governor being good), respectively.
which leads to (7) with the new de…nition of V E [W (y
The incumbent's posterior reputation becomes: 
B Model with a Three-Term Limit
Here we highlight some of the key changes in the model with a three-term limit. More details are available upon request. De…ne the vector S t [y t ; " t ;^ t 1 ] for term t of a governor, t ^ (S t ) is the updated probability that a governor is of good type given the information in S t : The bad governors solve the following problems in the three periods they are potentially in o¢ ce 
The environment is complete with the election probability in term t -15) and the updating by the voter 
C Some Computational Details
We need to evaluate some integrals numerically to obtain (22) and (23) in the text. Note that all the integrals we deal with have the following general form Finally, using Gauss-Hermite quadrature we can approximate this integral using
where thex i and ! i are the Gauss-Hermite quadrature nodes and weights respectively and m is the order of integration.
Turning to the integrals in (22) A-4
and A 2 can be computed using a Gauss-Hermite approximation using 1 (y Notes: The no-discipline counterfactual is obtained by setting the cost of exerting high effort for bad governors to c = 1 so that they never exert high effort, and re-solving the model so that the voters optimally react to this. The solution uses the estimates of the structural parameters reported in Table 1 . Notes: y 1 and y 2 , when available, show the JAR performance of the governor. The absence of y 2 indicate that the governor did not win a second term.π(y 1 ) is the updated probability of the governor being good, conditional on first-term performance and ψ(y 1 ) is the probability that the governor will win re-election based on first-term performance.π (y 1 , R, y 2 ) is the probability that the governor is good, having observed both terms' performance, where available.
